Faculty Scholarship
9-1997

The Future of the Third Sector
Roger A. Lohmann

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Nonprofit Administration and Management Commons, Public Administration Commons,
Public Affairs Commons, Public Policy Commons, Social Policy Commons, and the Social Welfare
Commons

THE FUTURE OF THE THIRD
SECTOR1
Roger A. Lohmann
West Virginia University
Introduction

The general thesis I wish to explore here is that the peculiar forms
of contemporary national Third Sectors which, according to
Salamon (1993) are currently spreading around the world arose in
a unique historical moment and are unlikely to outlast that
moment in history. It may indeed be true, as I and others have
argued, that certain features of the contemporary Third Sector
(particularly those I have labeled commons) are more or less
permanent features of human community. (Lohmann, 1992)
However, self-help and mutual aid groups, voluntary associations,
social movement organizations and the like are not generally seen
as the principal or defining characteristics of the contemporary
Third Sector, Instead, the sector is seen as consisting of – and
defined by – paid employment in tax-exempt “nonprofit”,
“voluntary” or “nongovernment” organizations, charged with
vending services to defined and recognized clientele and
supported partly or wholly by public funding. In brief, if this
particular Third Sector configuration were to prove long-lasting,
it must be deemed an entirely new form of public management by
essentially private entities.
Failure Theory

Any conclusions about the permanency of change represented by
the hegemony within the Third Sector of nonprofit organizations,
however, must consider the unique national circumstances under
which these organizations are arising in various nation states. In
the case of the United States, for example, the rise of this putative
Third Sector was a unique and momentary product of late 20th
century American public life. Conditions are already developing
to transform this particular configuration into something new,
different, and perhaps unrecognizable. Thus, it is quite
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appropriate to ask whether there has been another transformation
in the particular circumstances that brought the recent
proliferation of nonprofit corporations and whether that change is
sufficient to lead to the demise in the near future of the nonprofit
sector as we have come to know it?
Something approaching a consensus appears to exist among
American Third Sector scholars that the rise of a sector of more
than a million nonprofit organizations and at least 40,000
donative foundations is due in large part to twin failures of
government (“state failure”) and business (“market failure”).
These twin failures, together with the enduring characteristics of
information asymmetry, the behaviorism of incentive theory and
legal and ethical non-distribution constraints are the cornerstones
of third sector theory in its present state.
The Nonprofit Sector Model

Viewing the Third Sector as a strictly contemporary phenomenon
gives a hard edge to Peter Dobkin Hall’s assertion that the
American nonprofit sector came into being only in recent decades
in the wake of the Filer Commission. (Hall, 1992) It seems clear
that the term nonprofit sector as ordinarily used by researchers in
economics, public policy, and the sociology of organizations is a
largely ethnocentric term, indigenous to the English speaking, or
Anglo nations of the United States, Canada, Britain, Australia and
New Zealand, and to a lesser degree, the developed nations of the
industrialized world.
Its export to the rest of the world is often treated as a
straightforward issue of “technology transfer”; an approach that
conveniently glosses over a number of complex and difficult
cultural and political issues. It is from this First World base that
Salamon (1993) has detected an international associational
revolution in terms of the diffusion of American-style nonprofit
corporations/organizations to the rest of the world.
Nonprofit sector is also a largely contemporaneous term, both in
usage and in meaning, containing no explicit reference to the past,
and no future connotations other than Whiggish continuity.
Protests that charitable, philanthropic and associational activities
existed prior to the Filer Commission miss the essential point:
There may have been (indeed, there were) other related
phenomena in other places and in other times, but the
contemporary term Third Sector as it is ordinarily used does not
extend to them. The terms Nonprofit and Third Sector, as they are

currently used, do not purport to cover the entire history of
human association in all human cultures, or the full scope of
charity, philanthropy, self-help and volunteering in past, present
or future. These terms are, and should continue to be, narrower
references to particular, post-war national regimes.
The Nonprofit Sector is a socio-economic world of professionally
staffed nonprofit organizations, legally organized as tax-exempt
nonprofit corporations and operating on the basis of
distributionally-constrained managerial entrepreneurship, and
with revenue streams derived in significant degree from publicsector grants, contracts and transfer payments, just as its
adherents suggest. It is also a world in which entrepreneurs who
create and work for nonprofit corporations may choose to take
advantage of available tax exemptions and to cloak their activities
(whether authentically or disingenuously) in the rhetoric of
charity and philanthropy. All of this offers no great mystery.
Moreover, the fact that these contemporary national Third Sectors
have largely become the domain of organizational entrepreneurs
should surprise no one familiar with the history of public
management. Such entrepreneurs have been attracted by a broad
range of public transfer payments to create charitable,
philanthropic, volunteer, and other programs. Incentive theory is
one of the bastions on which entrepreneurial Third Sector
ideology was built, and public transfer payments offer a
particularly attractive set of incentives. In fact, declines in
available transfer payments to nonprofit corporations can be
considered one of the surest predictors of future declines in this
Third Sector.
Alternative Futures

I have tried in various ways during the past decade to articulate
the view that the Nonprofit Sector conceived in this manner, is
simply one of several subclasses of a larger and more enduring
category of human voluntary association over time and across
cultures. Because this larger class of associations has no generally
accepted name, I sought to apply the term commons. From this
vantage point, the formal, nonprofit, professionally-staffed
organizations in the current Third Sector are one of the members
of a larger class of social organizations which also includes
hunting, gathering and war parties of primitive cultures; the
confraternities and guilds of medieval Europe; the scientific
academies of the 17th century, the coffeehouses of 18th century
London to which Habermas (1989) traces the origins of modern

publics, the voluntary associations observed by Tocqueville, the
voluntary agencies of the late 19th and early 20th century, the
waqfs of the Arab world, Buddhist monastic organizations,
(Lohmann, 1995a; 1997), Maori morais, Central American fiesta
organizations (Brass, 1986;Smith, 1977), and many more
examples.
Just as we have no generally accepted name for this larger class of
organizations that includes nonprofit organizations, we similarly
have no name for the larger classes of culture complexes or
regimes in which they are embedded. Extending the terms
Nonprofit or Third Sector indiscriminately to the entire class of
organizations or to the class of regimes merely serves to mask
over very real differences between them and the specific,
contemporary regime of the nonprofit sector and lead to no end of
confusion and pointless debate.
Unlike the American voluntary associations cited by de
Tocqueville or the European confraternities of medieval
Christendom, the contemporary nonprofit organizations of the
Third Sector, do not strike me as particularly definitive members
of this larger class nor as constituting a particularly definitive
regime. (That is to say, neither is an ideal type in the Weberian
sense.) Because of their origins in the failures of state and market
in the welfare state “mixed economy”, both may be thought of
more accurately as marginal phenomena or amalgams; admixtures
of characteristic traits of state, market and commons.
The contemporary Nonprofit Sector deserves to be seen, as Hall
suggests, as a new and distinct phenomenon. To fully accept this
view, however, is also to recognize that the contemporary
Nonprofit Sector should be seen as a secondary institutional
phenomenon. One simply cannot have it both ways: If the third
sector is as its adherents present it, a product of the recent
moment, then it is also not a foundational social and political
complex like the family, state, market or civil society. Our
collective social life has not been fundamentally transformed by
the emergence of this third sector in the way, for example, that it
was by the historic emergence of the political state or the market.
Instead, the third sector represents a socio-economic complex
located at the margins of contemporary state and market civil
society. It is an expression of contemporary civil society which
survives largely because of protection and subsidy by the state
and the apparent attractiveness of its attractive economic
incentives it creates in certain (e.g., labor) markets.

From this vantage point, this American Nonprofit Sector looks
less and less like any type of enduring social reality, and more
and more like a macro-social episode. It may be a unique macroevent in the post-war world resulting perhaps from post-war
economic growth; the restless idealism of the Kennedy years; a
male-WASP political elite in decline; the baby boom-inspired
need to expand employment opportunities; the interest-group
liberalism of national politics; the growth of health care spending;
the backlash against government, combined with healthy doses of
opportunism toward the traditional legal backwaters of state
nonprofit law and the arcane complexities of corporate tax law,
together with large measures of adventurism, chicanery and
innovation.

The Decline and Fall of
The Nonprofit Sector?

A unique set of historical circumstances over the past two decades
caught the attention of students of the nonprofit sector in
economics and the management disciplines and proponents of
voluntary action in sociology, social work and political science
and fostered attempts (still incomplete and open-ended) to
develop convergent, multi-disciplinary paradigms of the nonprofit
sector. Subtle but important disciplinary and theoretical
differences in unit of analysis (corporation, organization,
association, group, etc.), time frame (specious present, past, or in
this case future), intent (pure research or practice) and other
issues were set aside as immediate contemporary concerns were
explored.
The is room here for the positions of Salamon, Hall and Smith:
(Hall, 1992; Smith, 199X) While voluntary action may fluctuate
across time, it is as an essential characteristic of the human
condition even more fundamental than, and underlying, market
trading or political states and will always be with us to one degree
or another. By contrast, the Third Sector and the resulting
questions over nonprofit behavior and nonprofit organization
result from a unique historical configuration which arose out of
the particular political circumstances which Theodore Lowi has
characterized as interest group liberalism (1969) and, more
recently, late Second Republic decadence (1994). Michael Sandel
(1996) has characterized this as the rise of the Procedural
Republic. Robert Samuelson (1995) sees it in terms of the rise of
a pernicious political culture of “entitlement” in which citizens (in
a reversal of the famous call to public service issued by President

Kennedy in 1960) ask not what they can do for their country, but
rather what their country can do for them.
At this time, it is not at all difficult to visualize a relatively large
number of present and foreseeable conditions leading to the
demise of substantial portions of this American Nonprofit Sector.
Unfavorable tax rulings, cuts in public subsidies and tighter
enforcement of tax-exempt status are just three of a broad range
of circumstances which could easily bring such a change.
Nonprofit corporations are easily created. They just as easily
disappear. If enough of them disappear, so apparently does the
sector, at least as it is presently conceived. In the remainder of
this paper, I want to concentrate on a number of factors and
forces associated with the creation of the Third Sector that are
currently pointing toward its demise.
Government Failure

In the usual constructions, one of the factors out of which the
contemporary Third Sector of nonprofit organizations is said to
have risen is government failure. (Salamon, 1987) However, most
accounts of these failures are not very specific about what
particular failures of government were actually involved. Let us
attempt to be somewhat clearer:
Institutional failure is a rather peculiar basis from which to begin
theorizing the Third Sector, as I noted in an article a number of
years ago. (Lohmann, 1989) However, once such a course is set,
it is somewhat disingenuous not to clearly identify the specific
market and state failures that gave rise to the armada of nonprofit
organizations which currently dominate the third sector. For
example, welfare state theory is premised upon the failure of
market mechanisms to protect the wellbeing of workers and
consumers. And, in turn, it was perceived failures of public
management that have given rise to the sustained assault by the
new right upon government institutions of all types. So much
seems clear.
Is seems equally clear that the original ‘sector’ of American
voluntary associations which Tocqueville observed in the North
America of the 1840’s was also subject to institutional failures.
We might summarize these as the failure of medieval European
systems of aristocratic patronage, and church-sanctioned
community and charity organization to take hold in the new
world. Much of what Tocqueville observed amounts to a report of
his sense of wonder that associations of commoners in everyday

life could occur without aristocratic protection and beneficence or
the institutional legitimation of church or state. This form of
argument is inherently tautological. In this same sense, virtually
any type of social change can be reconstructed as the failure of
conditions in effect prior to the change.
It was not any particular parliamentary, legislative or judicial
failures or ineffective public management, nor recognition of any
such failures by reform or study commissions, to which we can
properly trace the rise of nonprofit organizations in the American
third sector of the 1960’s and 1970’s. In the first instance, it was
the legislative successes of President Lyndon Johnson in the wake
of the Kennedy assassination that both created the diverse
discretionary grant programs and devised the legal apparatus
whereby nonprofit “community” groups could apply for and
received public funds independently. (Unger, 1996).
In a second stage of privatization, the administration of Richard
Nixon later extended this same eligibility to private, for-profit
groups. A vast range of pseudo-markets were thereby created in
which large groups of service-consumers are aided in purchasing
health, social and other services from large groups of commercial
vendors through public subsidies from a single faux-buyer: the
federal government.
The role of public management failures is somewhat more
complex in the American case. For some time now, politicians
and journalists have been blaming “bureaucrats” for many of the
ills of the world. However, it was not the putative evils of
bureaucracy, but rather constitutional limits and the
characteristics of budget politics of the federal bureaucracy
during the 1950s and 1960s that gave rise to the organizational
third sector. (Wildavsky, 1967)
One plausible approach is to argue that the most significant
governmental failure was the inability of federal bureaus (such as
those reorganized into the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare during the 1950 s) to muster sufficient support in the
Congressional budget process and Constitutional limits which
restricted the abilities of these same bureaus to develop and
administer service programs of their own . In the post-war
decades during which the Third Sector is said to have arisen,
these same federal agencies could not look to state and local
government for support. As Lowi (1994) notes, American state
and local governments were during that time collectively the
traditionalist bastion of the very same “old order” (i.e.,

traditionalist) conservatism which formed the base for opposition
to these federal programs.
Anyone who was alive at the time surely remembers the role of
southern governors, legislators and local governments in leading
the opposition to civil rights reforms, for example. Institutional
racism in this sense did not come from the people, but directly
from state and local government. How, then, could progressive
forces introduce and institutionalize change with protectors of the
existing order in every city hall, courthouse and state capital? At
least part of the answer was to be found in the resurgence of the
doctrine of local community and specific, newly (and under state
laws, easily) created nonprofit corporations which could be (and
was) used to by-pass the traditionalist state-local political
structure entirely. To some extent, this configuration continues: It
was the state governors who led the recently successful initiative
for “welfare reform”, for example.
As the Johnson Administration demonstrated clearly with the
Community Action Phase of the War on Poverty, grants and later
contracting out the actual delivery of services to nonprofit
organizations could by-pass the opposition and create an instant
constituency of supporters for any program from which funds can
be distributed. In the name of "the community" similar by-passes
were arranged through the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act, Community Mental Health Centers Act, Older Americans
Act and other legislative acts of the Great Society. Throughout
the period during which the Third Sector is said to have arisen,
this strategy for compensating for budget and program failures
that began in the precincts of H.E.W. was passed from federal
agency to agency, even reaching such bureaus as the U.S. Forest
Service and the Environmental Protection Agency. In this way,
hundreds of thousands of nonprofit organizations compensated
for this particular set of government failures and created one
important core of the nonprofit sector profile as it is currently
understood.
I am tempted to believe that something of the same forces are at
work in Great Britain, partly because of the parallel
administrations of Thatcher-Reagan and Clinton-Blair. On CSpan recently, I watched your prime minister in a ‘town meeting’
on crime in the Worchester Town Hall extol the virtues of
localism and ‘community action.’
Perhaps we might conclude from this that the most general
failures of government which give rise to the contemporary
national third sectors are failures to know what to do and how to

muster the political capital to do it in the areas of social policy. In
this familiar scenario, politicians escape into flights of rhetorical
excess. They leave the actual working out of policy in areas such
as families, housing, social care arrangements to the negotiations
between public bureaucrats and nonprofit administrators.
While this iron triangle strategy was highly successful in the short
run, it has also had certain side effects. According to Lowi (1994)
it succeeded in shifting the balance of power between federal and
state governments and disrupting the community base of old order
conservatism. This is one of the enduring discontents with "big"
government known collectively as the conservative revolution
which has been largely responsible since 1980 for threatening and
undermining the funding base of these same government bureaus
and their Third Sector constituents. Half the recent American
presidents (Carter, Reagan and Clinton) are former governors.
Another side effect, noted by Unger (1996) was the
transformation of opportunities into entitlements which is at the
core of the current crisis of the American welfare state.
Among other things, focus on these particular government
failures explains why privatization which in other nations has
been largely an issue of the transfer of public assets to private
owners has, in the United States, been seen more as a quest for
new (nongovernmental) support for the Third Sector. This
analysis also explains the otherwise curious reluctance of so many
of those seeking to define the Third Sector in the United States to
include the grassroots , voluntary association, fund-raising, social
movement and other dimensions of the conservative revolution
within the domain of the Third Sector. This conservative
revolution may, in fact, successful constrain future development
of the Third Sector in either of two ways by establishing a new
regime dramatically limiting the powers and expenditures of
government, or through the less ambitious oppositional role of
placing severe practical limits on spending increases and new
programs. In this way, conservatism does not need to win to
succeed: Either way, the public revenue streams which form the
life-blood of what Wolch (1990) has termed the shadow state are
undercut. Thus, the very forces that for several decades made of
the nonprofit sector a way of overcoming the particular
government failures of federalism, traditionalism and
bipartisanship may in the future result in the undoing of the
sector.
The present American Third Sector is, in these rather distinctive
senses, almost certainly a product of government failures.

Correcting Market Failures

The second major dynamic said to be responsible for the historic
rise of the Third Sector is market failure. In at least one important
respect, paid employment, there almost certainly has been no
failure at all; the nonprofit sector appears to function more or less
normally in the national labor markets. Unlike voluntary
associations, clubs, social movements and other actors in
voluntary action, the nonprofit organizations of the Third Sector
are, therefore, in at least one important respect inherent parts of
the overall market structure of national economies. Theoretical
focus on nonprofit production has generally understated the
importance of this particular factor. Thus, the continuation of paid
staff employment in future nonprofit organizations is one measure
of the continuing success of the sector in staving off market
failure; not an indicator of such failure.
Another anticipated market failure may have largely failed to
materialize at least in part because of the rise of the Third Sector.
In fact, one of the largely unsung accomplishments of the Third
Sector may have been its role in absorbing the demographic
surplus army of (high school and college graduate) baby-boomers
who entered the labor market during the period of rapid growth of
the Sector. Earlier expectations of a glut of workers entering the
labor force in the baby boomer years proved largely unfounded.
While general expansion of the economy is, no doubt, the most
important reason, the creation of new jobs in those million
nonprofit corporations has to be given a measure of credit as well.
In at least three other distinct but equally important senses, the
very market failures which are said to have resulted in the rise of
the Nonprofit Sector could in the future bring nonprofit
organizations fully back into the marketplace. One pair of such
market failures is the failure of organizations delivering
specialized, consumer services as diverse as hospitals, opera and
ballet companies, and museums to be sufficiently competitive in
consumer and capital markets to attract sufficient investment to
underwrite operations and returns on investment. For example,
high culture has generally been much less successful than
middlebrow and pop culture in the entertainment marketplace.
The American Symphony Orchestra League, for example, is one
of many nonprofit industry groups looking closely at their market
position, both in labor and capital markets. Like many other
nonprofit industries, symphony orchestras have generally been

unsuccessful in pricing their products high enough to cover costs
and generate profits, yet low enough to attract broad customer
bases.
An unrelated third market failure that appears only in retrospect is
the inability or unwillingness of capital markets to respond to
basic demographic changes in society. These include the
declining youth market in the wake of the baby boom and the rise
of elderly consumers and the identification and definition of other
new classes of consumers. Public funding of nonprofit service
industries in these cases has served to demonstrate both that
potential untapped markets existed and to define entirely new
markets.
Despite the vaunted adventurism and allegedly restless
entrepreneurial spirit of private enterprise, venture capitalists
often proved to be remarkably unimaginative during the
formative period of the nonprofit sector. Thus, for example, it
was only after the efficacy of a series of specific service products
like hospice, home health care or meals on wheels were defined,
refined and market-proven by nonprofit vendors that private,
commercial delivery of such services begin to emerge. Even
today it is still unclear whether some of these markets (e.g.,
nursing homes and home health care) could be sustained on a
purely private, competitive basis, or whether public third-party
funds are necessary to sustain pseudo-markets for these services.
(Where the latter proves to be the case, of course, much of the
current rhetoric for privatization American-style simply
disappears.)

Service Marketization

In any event, all three of these types of market failures seem to
point directly to the eventual demise of the present Nonprofit
Sector through processes resulting in corrections of the specific
market failures which led to the rise of the sector. We hear a great
deal today about the role of venture capital in the computer
software and information processing industries. Less clear has
been the role of public funding of the Third Sector as a distinctive
form of public venture capitalization of new markets. What is
involved here might be seen as a three-stage process, labeled with
the inelegant term "marketization." The marketization process
begins with public venture capitalization (grants and contracts to
nonprofit organizations) and leads to increasingly clear product

definition and private market formation. Public funding of the
Third Sector has provided the initial capitalization for a
staggering variety of products and services, many of which
simply disappeared after an initial subsidy ran out, but others of
which were clarified into distinct consumer products currently
being marketed privately in newly emergent markets. Much of the
private market in child day care services, for example, is
following the patterns set out by the federally subsidized Head
Start program.
For at least some of the goods and services capitalized through
the grant funding operations associated with state failure , the
next step is oblivion. Generally speaking, the rhetoric of
demonstration projects , innovation and social change
surrounding public programs for the past three decades has tended
to ignore or downplay their role in marketizing new services.
One interesting aspect of this phenomenon which nonprofit
administrators have generally failed to heed is the way in which
parallels between market success and support for public funding
can adversely affect public as well as private support. It is not
only the useless, pointless and trivial which can fall victim to this
process, however. If, in the long run, a market fails to coalesce
around a product created in this way, not only is its marketability
impaired. The very fact of its failure in the marketplace casts new
doubts on its continuing legitimacy as an object of public support
as well. Thus, the success of some museums and symphony
orchestras in using public funds to leverage commercially
successful events may put additional pressures on others use of
public funds to support experimental or other non-commercially
viable events. If enough people don t want to buy tickets, it is
said, how worthy can the event be? In much the same vein, the
commercial successes of some initiatives in health and human
services have placed increasing pressures on all service providers
to ignore, neglect or under-serve the poorest, most difficult and
riskiest patients and clients and are eroding the long-term
legitimacy of efforts to work with these groups.
However, some ideas that receive funding are sufficiently
practical, useful or interesting that they attract widespread interest
and result in the formation of actual product markets where none
previously existed. There may be no clearer case of this than
federally funded Meals on Wheels, a small program of a few
million dollars first introduced under Title III of the Older
Americans Act. By the late 1960 s, home-deliveries of food,
whether raw or prepared, had almost ceased in the U.S. But
consumers whose parents or grandparents received prepared,

home-delivered meals probably formed the original core of the
market for home-delivered pizzas, which has since broadened out
into home, hotel, office and athletic field delivery of an amazing
variety of food products on a strictly commercial basis.
Similar observations can be made about products as diverse as the
Jeep and Hum-Vee to freeze-dried ice cream. Markets have also
emerged in recreation services for older people, homemaker and
home health care services, and other examples where the market
potential was recognized only after the product was defined or
marketized by publicly funded programs.

Conclusion: Nonprofit Obsolescence?

Close examination of the government and market failures which
are credited with leading to the rise of the Nonprofit Sector shows
that both sets of failures are proving to be, to some degree, selfcorrecting. Thus, the governmental failures of budget
constituency and limits on service provision which led to the rise
of interest group liberalism (Lowi, 1969) and the shadow state
(Wolch, 1990) that we know as The Third Sector also led
eventually to Reaganomics, the Gingrich revolution of 1994, and
the protests against tax exemption, charity fraud and other
questions which leave the long term existence of The Sector very
much in doubt.
There may, in fact, be something of an iron law at work here that
points to the inevitable demise of the Third Sector, or at least,
major portions of it. Public subsidy of nonprofit activity in the
Third Sector form of specific responses to capital and product
market failures of seemingly desirable objectives may set off a
series of marketization dynamics resulting in the eventual
commercialization of that product or service. Marketization may
also undermine the long-term legitimacy as other, similar objects
of public support which are not a commercial success. Either way,
the third sector loses in the end: If a product or service created by
public subsidy of the Third Sector is successful commercially,
there is no need for continued support of its nonprofit production,
and if it is not commercially successful, how can continued public
support be justified?
Thus, if one looks to the government and market failure
arguments as the source of the particular configuration of
nonprofit enterprise we currently call the third sector, one can

also see that the very forces that led to the rise of the third sector
are currently pointing toward its decline. Such a decline, if it
occurs, is a process that can be expected to unfold along lines
dictated by state and market forces, and have little if anything to
do with developments in the commons.
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